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Introduction
The first years of the twenty-first century saw a nexus of two issues that 
led, eventually, to the recasting of interception law in many Western states. 
The first of these was a growing awareness in the security agencies that 
communications technology and behaviours were changing in such a fun-
damental way that traditional approaches to achieving signals interception 
(SIGINT) were coming under serious question. Then. in May 2013, a con-
tractor working for the US government by the name of Edward Snowden 
broke ranks and facilitated the publication of a welter of highly classified 
documents concerning the SIGINT activities of the US National Security 
Agency (NSA) and those of its key partners, notably Britain’s Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). These exposed an industrial-scale 
process of bulk communications interception at a scale that most could 
not have imagined. It also posed serious questions about whether and how 
Western oversight bodies had known about these activities and been part of 
any debate about them.
These developments brought together two sets of public debates that piv-
oted around the perennial question of privacy versus security. Whether or 
not Snowden was right to reveal the extent of information that he revealed, 
he certainly did ignite a debate across Western countries about the accept-
able levels of modern-day interception activity and how European states 
should interact with their American partners.
In the UK, Snowden’s revelations had the effect of punctuating a debate 
already underway about whether and how surveillance and interception law 
should be changed to reflect the new technological – and perhaps ethical – 
environment. The debates led in time to the drafting of a new Bill, called the 
Investigatory Powers Act (IPA), which eventually passed into law at the end 
of 2016 after very extensive debate and scrutiny, including a challenge from 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
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We could ask the question as to whether Snowden’s actions, which place 
him in exile in Russia facing multiple years in jail should he return to the US, 
caused a retrenchment of industrial-scale Western surveillance and intercep-
tion activities. The answer, perhaps ironically, is that the opposite seems to 
have happened. Taking the UK’s IPA as an example, many Western states 
continue to have considerable interception capabilities and powers and have 
arguably deepened and strengthened these powers in many cases. Indeed, it 
could be argued that the state’s professed need to continue to be able to tackle 
the security threats of the twenty-first century despite significant changes in 
technology have won out over any public concerns that may exist about ero-
sions of privacy. As a side issue, continuing questions about whether Western 
oversight and accountability regimes have sufficient teeth to be able to take on 
the security agencies seem only to have been exacerbated.
This chapter will consider the chronology of events in the UK case study, 
starting in the late 2000s and moving on to the passing of the IPA in 2016. 
It interprets this story in terms of whether and how the state interacted with 
its critics in developing a refreshed surveillance regime; how the oversight 
bodies fared throughout the period; and where this leaves questions of 
 privacy-versus-security in the final analysis.
Snowden’s revelations
In late May 2013, a contractor working for the US firm Booz Allen Hamilton 
by the name of Edward Snowden, travelled from Hawaii to Hong Kong. He 
was carrying a set of laptops on which were stored approximately 1.7 mil-
lion classified documents that he had extracted from the National Security 
Agency (NSA’s) databases. Once in Hong Kong, he met with two journal-
ists and a documentary film-maker, and on 5 June 2013, The Guardian 
newspaper in the UK published the first of a set of hitherto highly classified 
revelations derived from these documents. The details implicated not only 
the NSA but also its key SIGINT partner, GCHQ, in industrial-scale inter-
ception and collection of global communications at a scale and method that 
were, so it was implied, hugely disproportionate and potentially unlawful. 
On 9 June, Snowden went public himself for the first time with an interview 
aired on the internet in which he claimed that ‘he had done nothing wrong’.1 
On 23 June, having been stripped of his passport other than for the purpose 
of returning to the US, he was allowed entry to Moscow.
1  Mirren Gidda (2013) ‘Edward Snowden and the NSA files – timeline’, The Guardian, 21 
August 2013, retrieved from www.t hegua rdian .com/ world /2013 /jun/ 23/ed ward- snowd en-ns 
a-fil es-ti melin e [accessed 4 April 2018].
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The impact of the revelations on intelligence operations in the US, 
UK, and elsewhere is virtually impossible to delineate from the outside. A 
recent head of MI5 has been quoted as saying the disclosure of the details 
was a ‘gift’ to terrorists,2 as they could tighten-up their communications 
security now that they had a better knowledge of how the major intelli-
gence services attempted to monitor them. The US’s Director of National 
Intelligence at the time, James Clapper, told the Senate Intelligence 
Committee that Snowden’s revelations had caused ‘grave damage’ to the 
intelligence operation.3 Meanwhile, the former chief of both NSA and 
CIA, General Michael Hayden, found himself in hot water shortly after 
the revelations by responding to a question on whether Snowden should be 
on the list of nominees for the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for 
Freedom of Thought, by admitting he had briefly pondered whether there 
was a different list that might have more appropriately borne Snowden’s 
name.4 Whatever the difficulties, it seems likely that the sheer scale of the 
leaked documentation and the very high levels of classification that had 
previously applied to much of it, suggest that potentially considerable risk 
was generated for the protection of sensitive capabilities and their effec-
tive operation following Snowden’s disclosures.
In civil society, meanwhile, the questions were not so much about the 
potential damage caused to the intelligence operation by the disclosures, or 
indeed about the illegality or moral purpose of the way in which Snowden 
had stolen and leaked the documents, although these were subjects of 
sometimes heated discussion. Instead, the key questions were about both 
the spirit and letter of the law when considering the way in which major 
intelligence agencies on both sides of the Atlantic were operating. Much 
of this debate found itself in the philosophically grey area of the appropri-
ate balance between privacy and security in the modern age, and where 
the line should be drawn to indicate appropriate levels of national security 
policy. The civil society perspective has also highlighted the question of 
whistle-blowers and whether and how they should be protected in demo-
cratic states. While many in the intelligence business felt that Snowden 
was a traitor and a criminal, many in the realm of civil liberties activism 
felt that he was a heroic figure. Indeed, one of Snowden’s first visitors 
2  Cited in Michael V. Hayden (2014) ‘Beyond Snowden: An NSA reality check’, World 
Affairs, 176(5), 13–23.
3  Cited in Dave Weinstein (2014) ‘Snowden and US cyber power’, Georgetown Journal of 
International Affairs, 4, 4–11.
4  Michael V. Hayden (2014) ‘Beyond Snowden: An NSA reality check’, World Affairs, 176(5), 
13–23.
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in Moscow on his arrival was Jesselyn Radack, the US-based civil rights 
lawyer, who travelled to the Russian capital to present Snowden with an 
‘Integrity in Intelligence’ award.5
Questions of technology
General Hayden is right to claim that concerns about large-scale SIGINT 
exploitation by the major national security states did not come out of a clear 
blue sky with Snowden’s revelations in June 2013.6 In large part, the debate 
was already underway and being driven by the two not entirely comple-
mentary pressures of changes in technology that were making traditional 
approaches to SIGINT more difficult, and there was also a massive explo-
sion of personal data in cyberspace that raised extremely complex and 
ambiguous questions about the rights to, and boundaries of, privacy.
In the UK, a year before Snowden’s disclosures, the government had 
invited the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) to 
launch an inquiry that would feed into pre-legislative scrutiny of a new 
Bill governing the question of access by the security agencies to com-
munications data (that is, data about communications events rather than 
their content). The issue had been simmering for some time, since it was 
increasingly being recognised that changes in communications network 
configurations and in communications behaviours were leading to a 
gradual dwindling in the amount of traditional communications data the 
police and intelligence services could access to support their investiga-
tions. In particular, the rise of bundled contracts for consumers in which 
communications events were charged not by individual events but within 
general tariffs meant that the communications service providers (CSPs) 
were increasingly dropping plans to keep the sort of data traditionally 
characterised as ‘billing records’, since there was no commercial need 
to do so. The problem for the security agencies in the disappearance of 
these records (generally considered by them to be critical for analysing 
networks of individuals of interest) seemed to be compounded by the 
rise of internet-based communications, to which traditional notions of 
communications events and ‘metadata’ did not so easily apply. In their 
report on the draft Bill, published in February 2013, the ISC noted that the 
police, intelligence services, and selected other public bodies had made 
5  Wikileaks, (2013) ‘Video: Edward Snowden wins Sam Adams award Friday’ (12 October 2013), 
retrieved from https ://wi kilea ks.or g/Vid eo-Ed ward- Snowd en-wi ns-Sa m.htm l [accessed 12 
August 2018].
6  Michael V. Hayden (2014) ‘Beyond Snowden: An NSA reality check’, World Affairs, 176(5), 
13–23, p.14.
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approximately 500,000 requests for communications data from CSPs in 
the preceding year and that such data were ‘immensely valuable’ to inves-
tigations into serious crime and terrorism.7
The road to the 2016 Investigatory Powers Act 2016
Thus were commenced deliberations about a new Bill initially called the 
Communications Data Bill, which in 2016 eventually evolved into the wider 
Investigatory Powers Act (IPA). The beginning of the journey towards the 
realisation of this new law, however, starts some time before Snowden’s rev-
elations. Indeed, it is appropriate to go back to the general election of 2010 
to identify where the issue had started to become particularly problematic in 
the UK. In this election, a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition govern-
ment was the eventual result of a failure to achieve an overall majority by 
any of the major parties.
On the question of the expansion or retrenchment of the state’s surveil-
lance capabilities, we might suppose that the two partners in the coalition fell 
generally on either side of the line. To some extent this was true, although 
not entirely so. It was certainly the case that the nature of the coalition was 
such that sufficient votes to pass a proposed new Bill on access to commu-
nications data in parliament could not be assured. Much of the Conservative 
Party, led by Prime Minister David Cameron and the then Home Secretary, 
Theresa May, were sufficiently convinced by the security services’ ticking-
clock narrative about the dangers of the aforementioned decline in the capa-
bility to exploit communications data. But the Deputy Prime Minister and 
leader of the Liberal Democrats, Nick Clegg, had decried the proposed new 
Bill as a ‘snooper’s charter’; that is, a blank cheque for the state to spy on 
the populace at will. Clegg positioned himself as something of a gatekeeper 
against the more surveillance-minded instincts of some of his Conservative 
Party colleagues, warning that the new Bill, ‘won’t happen while Lib Dems 
are in government’.8
In the UK, two processes followed the release of the Snowden files 
in 2013. The first and most pressing issue was a very specific allegation 
of illegality on GCHQ’s part concerning a secret NSA operation called 
PRISM. This operation concerned the large-scale collection of communi-
cations data and content from US-based internet service providers (ISPs) 
under the mandate of the Foreign Intelligence Services Act (FISA), this is 
7  Intelligence and Security Committee (2013) ‘Access to communications data by the intelligence 
and security Agencies’, report presented to Parliament, Cm 8514, February 2013, p.8.
8  Stewart Mitchell (2013) ‘Lib Dems block “snooper’s charter’’’ (25 April 2013), retrieved from 
www.a lphr. com/p oliti cs/22 986/l ib-de ms-bl ock-s noope rs-ch arter [accessed 19 August 2018].
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an act passed in 1975 following the Church Committee inquiry that allows 
US security agencies to gain selective access to the communications of 
US-based individuals. (The act was initially aimed at the interception of the 
communications of hostile foreign intelligence personnel based in embassy 
premises in the US, but it can also be used on suspected terrorist targets 
using US-based CSPs.) Because the Snowden files revealed that GCHQ 
had also had extensive access to such FISA-authorised data through PRISM 
since 2007, allegations started to circulate in the UK press that the British 
agency was effectively gaining unwarranted access to the communications 
of UK individuals through their American partner.9 Following scrutiny of 
GCHQ files and processes, the ISC concluded robustly in July 2013 that no 
illegal access to such communications had taken place.10
However, the genie was now out of the bottle, and the ISC decided that 
a much broader investigation into the activities of GCHQ and other secu-
rity agencies in the post-Snowden environment had become appropriate. 
This led to the Privacy and Security Inquiry which took evidence over many 
months from a wide range of security agency personnel (including the 
chiefs of the UK three intelligence agencies) and in addition, academics, 
technicians, journalists, and representatives of civil liberties organisations. 
The subsequent report, entitled ‘Privacy and security: A modern and trans-
parent framework’ was published nearly two years later in March 2015.
Before the final report was published, however, the government initiated 
a series of events which constituted a cycle between legislation and chal-
lenge in the courts, with the CJEU playing a key role.
By 2014, the government found itself facing three problems concern-
ing continued access to communications data. The first was the technology 
problem described above, which many inside the security agencies felt was 
reaching crisis point. The second was the lack of political consensus on 
the issue within the coalition government, in which the Liberal Democrats 
had expressly said they would oppose the new Communications Data Bill. 
To these two challenges was added a judgement by the CJEU which sug-
gested that the UK’s current practice in this area, as defined by the 2000 
Regulatory and Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), was incompatible with 
the 2009 Data Retention Directive. Specifically, two areas of concern were 
highlighted: That internal authorisation for communications data requests 
in the UK did not involve sufficient scrutiny and that requests were not 
being restricted to matters concerning serious crime (including terrorism). 
9  Intelligence and Security Committee (2013) ‘Statement on GCHQ’s alleged interception 
of communications under the US PRISM programme’ (July 2013), retrieved from http: //
isc .inde pende nt.go v.uk/ commi ttee- repor ts/sp ecial -repo rts [accessed 20 September 2018].
10  Ibid.
TNFUK_02_TSSC_C002_docbook_indd.indd   24 10-04-2019   18:43:27
 Intelligence gathering, issues of accountability 25
This, it was suggested, meant that UK law was not providing sufficient pro-
tection of privacy under the 1998 Human Rights Act.
In response, the government took the controversial step of introducing an 
emergency piece of legislation called the Data Retention and Investigatory 
Powers Act (DRIPA), announced in parliament by the then Home Secretary 
Theresa May on 10 July 2014.11 The aim of this legislation was to ensure 
that the security agencies could continue to gain access to communications 
data from CSPs. Indeed, it introduced a new legal mandate for relevant com-
panies to retain such data for a year and make it available to the government 
as requested – while allowing debate and discussion to continue in the back-
ground. This would culminate in a new, over-arching law. A year later, the 
Conservative Party established an overall majority in the general election 
and was able to form a government without the Liberal Democrats, thus 
removing one of their obstacles to legislating in this area.
DRIPA proved to be a hot political potato. Immediately following its 
introduction, two MPs from across the political divide joined forces with a 
group of civil liberties NGOs to take the government to court on the issue. 
The alliance of David Davis, a Conservative MP with strong civil libertar-
ian sentiments, who would later become the government’s first Brexit min-
ister, and Tom Watson, who later became the deputy leader of the Labour 
Party, demonstrated the way in which the issue of state surveillance versus 
privacy rights cuts across traditional political fault lines. The two MPs joined 
forces with Liberty, Open Rights Group, Amnesty, and Privacy International 
to bring the case that DRIPA was incompatible with European human rights 
and data retention law. Just short of a year after Theresa May’s announcement 
of DRIPA in Parliament, the High Court ruled against the government and 
upheld the charge that DRIPA was ‘inconsistent with European Union Law’.12
The government appealed this decision, taking the case to the CJEU in 
Luxembourg, but before this appeal was heard, the ISC had reported the find-
ings of its major Privacy and Security Inquiry. The report preceded by three 
months the publication of a second report, commissioned separately from the 
government’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson 
QC, and published under the title ‘A question of trust’.13 Both reports informed 
11  Home Office (2014) ‘Home Secretary’s oral statement about the use of communications 
data and interception’ (10 July 2014), retrieved from www.g ov.uk /gove rnmen t/spe eches /
comm unica tions -data -and- inter cepti on [accessed 25 September 2018].
12  Owen Bowcott (2015) ‘High Court rules data retention and surveillance legislation unlaw-
ful’, The Guardian, 17 July 2015, retrieved from www.t hegua rdian .com/ world /2015 /jul/ 17/
da ta-re tenti on-an d-sur veill ance- legis latio n-rul ed-un lawfu l [accessed 5 April 2018].
13  David Anderson QC (2015) ‘A question of trust – report of the investigatory powers 
review’, 11 June 2015, retrieved from www.d aqc.c o.uk/ 2015/ 06/11 /a-qu estio n-of- trust 
-repo rt-of -the- inves tigat ory-p owers -revi ew/ [accessed 5 August 2018].
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the drafting of the new IPA Bill that commenced pre-legislative scrutiny in 
March 2016 and received Royal Assent in November of that year.
One of the key elements of the ISC’s ‘Privacy and security’ report, 
concerned legislation governing investigatory activities, and specifically 
the notion that RIPA and related pieces of legislation were too complex 
for anyone to easily navigate through, and were ill-equipped for affording 
privacy protections in the modern age of communications. The govern-
ment’s loss of the case in the High Court had further heightened anxieties. 
The key recommendation in the ISC report was therefore that, ‘the cur-
rent legal framework be replaced by a new Act of Parliament governing 
the intelligence and security Agencies’14 and was duly heeded with the 
drafting of the new Bill. The ISC did stress that its investigations into 
the work of the intelligence agencies gave it no cause to consider that the 
Human Rights Act was not being respected (a judgement at odds with 
the case brought by MPs Davis and Watson) but that the legal regime had 
become ‘unnecessarily complicated’ over the years. The Interception of 
Communications Commissioner, Sir Anthony May, was less charitable, 
noting in his 2013 annual report that15 ‘RIPA 2000 Part I Chapter I is dif-
ficult legislation and a reader’s eyes glaze over before reaching the end of 
section 1, that is, if the reader ever starts’.
Anderson’s ‘A question of trust’ report came to similar conclusions, 
suggesting that a ‘comprehensive and comprehensible new law should be 
drafted from scratch, replacing the multitude of current powers’.16 Perhaps 
sharing Sir Anthony May’s feelings, the Anderson report noted that:
RIPA, obscure since its inception, has been patched up so many times 
as to make it incomprehensible to all but a tiny band of initiates. A mul-
titude of alternative powers, some of them without statutory safeguards, 
confuse the picture further. This state of affairs is undemocratic, unnec-
essary and, in the long run, intolerable.17
14  Intelligence and Security Committee (2015) ‘Privacy and security: A modern and transpar-
ent legal framework’, report presented to Parliament, HC 1075 (12 March 2015) p.2.
15  Sir Anthony May (2014) ‘2013 Annual report of the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner’, HC 1184 (8 April 2014), retrieved from https ://as sets. publi shing .serv 
ice.g ov.uk /gove rnmen t/upl oads/ syste m/upl oads/ attac hment _data /file /3026 00/In terce ption 
Commu nicat ionsC ommis sione rAcce ssibl e.pdf [accessed 5 April 2018] p.61.
16  David Anderson QC (2015) ‘A question of trust – report of the Investigatory Powers 
Review’, 11 June 2015, retrieved from www.d aqc.c o.uk/ 2015/ 06/11 /a-qu estio n-of- trust 
-repo rt-of -the- inves tigat ory-p owers -revi ew/ [accessed 5 August 2018] p.4.
17  David Anderson QC (2015), ‘A question of trust – report of the Investigatory Powers 
Review’, 11 June 2015, retrieved from www.d aqc.c o.uk/ 2015/ 06/11 /a-qu estio n-of- trust 
-repo rt-of -the- inves tigat ory-p owers -revi ew/ [accessed 5 August 2018] p.8.
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David Anderson went further in suggesting that the three surveillance 
commissioners’ offices should be combined into one new Independent 
Surveillance and Intelligence Commission (ISIC), and that crucially this 
office should oversee the activities of a new set of judicial commissioners 
who would provide a second layer (on top of ministerial authorisation) to 
the authorisation of interception warrant requests.18
Such a suggestion would mark a significant departure from, and strength-
ening of, intelligence authorisation processes, albeit in the more highly 
intrusive area of content interception rather than that of the gathering of 
communications data, which, to a large extent, remained subject to the same 
level of authorisation in the new Bill as had been the case before.
The new IPA Bill was duly drafted and scrutinised and passed into law in 
December 2016. It incorporated many (though not all) of the recommenda-
tions of the various processes and reports informing its development. Many 
of its elements were not greatly dissimilar from those mandated under the 
former RIPA law, while some were quite different, and notably the require-
ment for ‘double-lock’ authorisation for content access warrants to be 
signed by a minister and a judicial commissioner.
On the political scene, Theresa May had become Prime Minister fol-
lowing David Cameron’s resignation in July 2016, but she managed to lose 
her parliamentary majority in the general election a year later, necessitat-
ing a new coalition with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Northern 
Ireland. While Brexit had become her government’s primary focus, the 
question of surveillance law suffered a further complication in December 
2017, when the CJEU finally completed its deliberations on the DRIPA 
appeal and upheld the judgement of the UK’s High Court in ruling that the 
act was unlawful. Although DRIPA had since been superseded by the IPA, 
many of the former’s elements had been incorporated into the latter, thus 
casting fresh doubt over the legality of the IPA under European law.19 This 
remains an unresolved legislative conundrum at the time of writing.
Reactions to the new IPA
At the stage of pre-legislative scrutiny, the ISC offered a mixed response 
to the proposed new law. The chairman of the ISC, Dominic Grieve, noted 
with satisfaction that many of the recommendations in the 2015 ‘Privacy 
18  David Anderson QC (2015) ‘A question of trust – report of the Investigatory Powers 
Review’, 11 June 2015, retrieved from www.d aqc.c o.uk/ 2015/ 06/11 /a-qu estio n-of- trust 
-repo rt-of -the- inves tigat ory-p owers -revi ew/ [accessed 5 August 2018] p.7.
19  Alexander J Martin (2016) ‘Landmark EU ruling: Legality of UK’s Investigatory Powers 
Act challenged’, The Register, 21 December 2016, retrieved from www.t hereg ister .co.u 
k/201 6/12/ 21/eu _judg ment/ [accessed 5 April 2018].
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and security’ report, notably those concerning strengthening the explicit 
authorisation of bulk personal datasets, bulk communications data, and 
‘computer network exploitation’ (for which we should read computer hack-
ing) had been acted upon20. However, Grieve conveyed ‘disappointment’ 
that the IPA did not mark a comprehensive re-drafting and consolidation of 
all surveillance law, but merely those elements concerning the interception 
and exploitation of communications and related data and cyber activities. 
Thus, other activities, such as covert surveillance and human intelligence 
operations, for example, continue under the auspices of the old RIPA law. 
This was, in the view of Grieve, a ‘missed opportunity’, and it remained the 
case in his view that the new bill, ‘fails to deliver the clarity that is so badly 
needed in this area’.21
Perhaps more seriously, the ISC chairman expressed disquiet about the 
clarity of privacy protections in the new law, suggesting that it had adopted 
a rather ‘piecemeal’ approach in which there was no universal definition of 
the approach to privacy.22
In this way, we could conclude that, rather than simplifying and clarify-
ing the overall approach to surveillance that had been a perceived problem 
with the ‘piecemeal’ and ‘obscure’ set of laws previously in place, the ISC’s 
conclusion is that the IPA has added to the confusion in some respects. As 
David Anderson noted above, this is not only tedious for those attempting 
to navigate through the law, but could even be perceived as fundamentally 
undermining of privacy protections in a modern democracy.
It is worth noting that the question of whether updating surveillance law 
improves or further complicates the situation, is not one confined to the 
UK. Other European countries, both before and after the Snowden revela-
tions, have grappled with the same challenges in trying to balance updated 
capabilities with concerns over privacy. Notable cases have included a case 
brought by the civil rights group Digital Rights Ireland concerning the reten-
tion of communications data by the Irish police, and a challenge brought 
against the Swedish government over the privacy protections afforded by 
interception law. In Germany, Snowden’s revelations led directly to the for-
mation of an ad hoc cross-parliamentary inquiry, called the ‘NSA inquiry’ 
(Untersuchungsausschuss, NSA) launched in March 2014, prompted by 
concerns over the depth of the SIGINT relationship with the US. This 
inquiry uncovered concerns and weaknesses in the authorisation process for 
20  Intelligence and Security Committee (2016) ‘Press release’ (9 February 2016) retrieved 
from http: //isc .inde pende nt.go v.uk/ news- archi ve?of fset= 10 [accessed 5 August 2018].
21  Ibid.
22  Ibid.
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SIGINT collection by the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), particularly as 
regards bulk data collection against foreign nationals, including close EU 
partners. The outcome was a set of legislative changes governing the activi-
ties of the BND, which were completed by 2016. Wetzling’s verdict on these 
changes is generally rather damning: not only did they, ‘not fix the country’s 
woefully inadequate judicial oversight system’23 but introduced new confu-
sions and gaps in the oversight machinery, leaving parliamentary oversight 
of intelligence ‘fragmented’.24
Whether such developments mark a conscious attempt by European states 
to obfuscate the law around surveillance and make the lives of the overseers 
more difficult, seems doubtful. At the same time, Snowden himself noted 
that NSA had been working with their SIGINT partners in Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden to consider how they could make their laws more 
conducive to SIGINT operations, citing the UK’s GCHQ as the model. This 
does at least show that the SIGINT agencies are very aware of the laws gov-
erning their activities and will be thinking about how best to achieve what 
they want to achieve within the legislative framework.
In terms of how the new IPA came about, it could be interpreted, as 
David Anderson did, that intense parliamentary scrutiny was undertaken for 
a period approaching ten years before the new law was passed concern-
ing interception activities. An early version of this, the Communications 
Data Bill, was rejected by Parliament and further drafting was undertaken. 
A major period of scrutiny by a joint committee across the two houses 
of Parliament, in addition to two major reports by the ISC and by the 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, were all brought to bear 
on the deliberations leading to the drafting of the new Bill, and some major 
changes to the authorisation and oversight regime governing interception 
were subsequently written in. While the DRIPA law was instituted as a piece 
of emergency legislation in 2014, it is fair to say that the over-arching pro-
cess of reviewing and changing the law could hardly be criticised as being 
either rushed or not subject to extensive parliamentary scrutiny. In this way, 
one could argue, democracy appears to have been working entirely appro-
priately and effectively.
These are the arguments for the executive’s position on the matter, but 
it is worth considering the concerns. It is fair to say that political changes 
23  Thorsten Wetzling (2013) ‘Germany’s intelligence reform: More surveillance, modest 
restraints and inefficient controls’, Stiftung Neuer Verantwortung, June 2017, retrieved from 
www.r esear chgat e.net /publ icati on/31 83938 82_Ge rmany ’s_int ellig ence_ refor m_Mor e_sur 
veill ance_ modes t_res train ts_an d_ine ffici ent_c ontro ls. p.3.
24  Ibid.
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over the period in question worked in favour of the Conservative Party in 
that a situation during coalition government when it was proving impossible 
to pass a new interception law gradually fell away in tandem with support 
for the Liberal Democrats at the polls. Once the Conservatives had estab-
lished their own majority government in 2015, progress towards the new 
Bill accelerated.
The recent CJEU’s ruling on the unlawfulness of certain provisions of the 
DRIPA Bill pose extremely complicated questions for the IPA in those areas 
where DRIPA provisions were adopted. The suggestion is that the govern-
ment has been allowing far too wide an application of intrusive surveillance 
powers, extending beyond serious crime and national security and into other 
areas of monitoring, such as tax and benefit compliance. Secondly, the pre-
existing model of separating communications content exploitation from the 
exploitation of communications data in terms of their relative intrusiveness 
has been somewhat blown apart by the CJEU. In the former, the IPA has 
greatly strengthened the authorisation regime, requiring not only ministerial 
sign-off on content interception warrants but also secondary approval from 
one of the new judicial commissioners. For communications data, however, 
the former level of authorisation has been retained, namely a ‘bulk access’ 
authorisation such that individual requests for batches of data need only be 
signed off by an appointed manager within the security agency in question. 
Furthermore, the CSPs now have a legal obligation under the IPA to retain 
such data for up to a year, should they need to make it available to a request-
ing government body.
The CJEU upheld the High Court’s ruling that the existing procedures do 
not provide adequate privacy protections to the public in the area of access-
ing communications data, and it is worth noting that such data now includes 
internet logging details as well as telephone call records. Restricting access 
amongst government departments to those dealing only with the most seri-
ous of cases may not be a huge problem, since the ISC noted in its February 
2013 report (published before Snowden’s revelations) that less than one 
percent of all communications data requests generally come from local 
authorities other than the main security agencies.25 However, applying an 
extra layer of authorisation to all communications data requests would be a 
serious complication, given that the same ISC report observed there were 
approximately half a million such requests made every year. The govern-
ment has proposed some changes to the IPA and taken the unusual step of 
25  Intelligence and Security Committee (2013) ‘Access to communications data by the intel-
ligence and security agencies’, report presented to Parliament, Cm 851. 
AU: Is there 
a date for 
the Cm to 
add to the 
foontnote?
TNFUK_02_TSSC_C002_docbook_indd.indd   30 10-04-2019   18:43:28
 Intelligence gathering, issues of accountability 31
laying these proposals out for consultation,26 although it is fair to say that 
the CJEU’s ruling does pose some very difficult procedural questions.
In the meantime, an overall assessment of the IPA could conclude that 
it allows the government to recover ground against the very changes it was 
fearing at the beginning of the process. In essence, nothing has changed in 
terms of the state’s continued capability in the area of interception. Indeed, 
on the question of access to communications data, the state has strengthened 
its hand by now being able to legally mandate the retention of and access to 
such data from the CSPs. Other activities that were underway before, such 
as cyber-operations (‘computer network exploitation’) continue, but with an 
added cloak of legal statute. If the government’s objective was to be able to 
retain the capabilities it had in communications and computer exploitation 
in the face of rapid and substantial technological change, then it appears to 
have achieved this aim.
For many in the field of civil liberties, however, this is far from a great 
outcome, and means that the questions posed by Snowden about the reach 
of the most powerful national security states have not been adequately 
addressed. Jen Stout of the NGO, Civil Society Futures, claimed that the 
passing of the IPA in 2016, ‘marked the point that the British government 
went off the deep end in terms of surveillance and authoritarianism’.27 Many 
will share this view that the new Bill is the essence of Nick Clegg’s ‘snoop-
er’s charter’, namely the legalisation of ‘mass surveillance’ as it is often 
described in sections of the media.
Questions about the oversight process
It should be the case that such fears are at least partially allayed by an effec-
tive intelligence oversight process. Within Parliament, potential concerns 
over the role and effectiveness of the parliamentary ISC committee are still 
matters of debate.
It is true that the Justice and Security Act of 2013, passed under the 
coalition government, did make some changes to the process of oversight. It 
is arguable, however, whether these changes amounted to much more than 
extending the range of intelligence community actors into whose activities 
26  Home Office call for consultation on the draft Investigatory Powers Act, retrieved 
from www.g ov.uk /gove rnmen t/con sulta tions /inve stiga tory- power s-act -2016 [accessed 
2 August 2018]. 
27  Jen Stout (2017) ‘It’s not just “fringe groups” that are at risk of surveillance – UK civil 
society needs to learn digital security, and fast’, Civil Society Futures, 25 July 2017, 
retrieved from https ://ci vilso ciety futur es.or g/not -just -frin ge-gr oups- risk- surve illan ce-uk 
-civi l-soc iety- needs -lear n-dig ital- secur ity-f ast/ [accessed 28 September 2018].
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the ISC could apply scrutiny to encompass the police and other public bod-
ies. It is still the case that the Prime Minister has to approve all appoint-
ments to the committee, in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, 
and in this way the committee still does not function in exactly the same way 
as other Parliamentary select committees. It is interesting to note that it took 
almost six months after the general election in 2017 to approve all of the 
newly appointed members of the ISC and for it to meet for the first time; a 
delay which was almost certainly because of political arguments over who 
should be on the committee between the Prime Minister, whose majority 
had been lost in the election, and a combative Leader of the Opposition.
These factors concerning appointments add to the general suspicion in 
some quarters that the ISC is too close to the establishment in that its members 
are generally expected to have prior experience of dealing with intelligence 
matters, usually in the shape of having been ministers of state in the past 
(although they cannot be a serving minister at the time of their appointment). 
This means that they may be more sympathetic to the needs of the intelligence 
services than would a committee member with no prior experience. As Defty 
argues, they might be reluctant to ‘ask difficult questions’.28 The contrast with 
the system for appointing oversight committee members in some other demo-
cratic countries, such as the US, the Netherlands, and Germany, for example, 
is marked in this respect. However, a counter-argument would be that there 
are already problems with committee members not always having the relevant 
technical expertise to be able to ask the right questions of the security services 
or indeed to understand which questions to ask at all, a problem shared by 
Germany and the UK in recent years, to name two.29 A lack of experience in 
committee members of intelligence matters may make these problems worse.
The verdict of both Gill30 and Phythian31 on the ISC’s performance in 
the pre-Snowden years was mixed. Both acknowledged that the ISC was 
28  Andrew Defty (2015) ‘It is time to adopt a different approach to appointing members of the 
Intelligence and Security Committee’, Democratic Audit UK, 24 March 2015, retrieved from 
http: //epr ints. lse.a c.uk/ 63151 /1/de mocra ticau dit.c om-It %20is %20ti me%20 to%20 adopt 
%20a% 20dif feren t%20a pproa ch%20 to%20 appoi nting %20me mbers %20of %20th e%20I 
ntell igenc e%20a nd%20 Secur ity%2 0Comm i.pdf [accessed 5 September 2018].
29  Marcel Fürstenau (2013) ‘Chancellery finds it hard to be transparent about intelligence’, 
Deutsche Welle television website, 25 July 2013, retrieved from www.d w.com /en/c hance 
llery -find s-it- hard- to-be -tran spare nt-ab out-i ntell igenc e/a-1 69747 76 [accessed 4 August 
2018].
30  Peter Gill (2007) ‘Evaluating intelligence oversight committees: The UK’s Intelligence and 
Security Committee and the “war on terror”’, Intelligence and National Security, 22(1), 
pp.14–37. 
31  Mark Phythian (2007) ‘The British experience with intelligence accountability’, Intelligence 
and National Security, 22(1), pp.75–99.
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essentially established to ‘serve the establishment’32 and that it could per-
haps be criticised for ‘resting too comfortably in the warm embrace of the 
Whitehall village’.33 At the same time, the ISC was having to design an effec-
tive culture of oversight when none to speak of had existed before, and when 
there were very few clues in the 1994 Intelligence Services Act as to how it 
should be done.34 In Gill’s eyes at least, the ISC had in its early years some-
what, ‘exceeded … expectations’.35 It had taken on for itself some degree of 
operational scrutiny, even though this was not technically part of its mandate 
until 2013, and it had produced some reasonably probing reports into such 
issues as the Mitrokhin affair, the intelligence concerning Iraqi weapons of 
mass destruction and the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
In the post-Snowden environment, the verdict on the ISC could be said 
to be similarly mixed. It is the case that the ISC undertook immediate action 
to investigate allegations of illegality on the specific question of the PRISM 
programme following Snowden’s revelations (eventually ruling in favour 
of the government). The subsequent breadth of the Privacy and Security 
Inquiry, which published its findings two years later, undoubtedly provided 
one of the most significant inputs to the drafting of the new Bill.
In other ways, however, the ISC is almost inevitably somewhat tooth-
less, with a mandate to complain when things go wrong but no power 
to see any action necessarily result. Although not a concern arising 
directly from Snowden’s revelations, the ISC noted in its report on the 
UK-authored drone strikes in Syria in September 2015 that the failure 
by the government to make available to its inquiry a number of sensitive 
documents had been ‘profoundly disappointing’ and, ‘had a significant 
bearing on the conclusions’.36 These are fairly damning words to level at 
32  Ibid, p.95.
33  Peter Gill (2007) ‘Evaluating intelligence oversight committees: the UK’s Intelligence and 
Security Committee and the “war on terror”’, Intelligence and National Security, 22(1), p.31.
34  Mark Phythian (2007) ‘The British experience with intelligence accountability’, Intelligence 
and National Security, 22(1), p.97.
35  Peter Gill (2007) ‘Evaluating intelligence oversight committees: the UK’s Intelligence and 
Security Committee and the “war on terror”’, Intelligence and National Security, 22(1), p.32.
36  Intelligence and Security Committee (2017) ‘UK lethal drone strikes in Syria’, report pre-
sented to Parliament, HC 1152 (26 April 2017), retrieved from https ://b1 cba9b 3-a-5 e6631 
fd-s- sites .goog legro ups.c om/a/ indep enden t.gov .uk/i sc/fi les/2 01704 26_UK _Leth al_Dr 
one_S trike s_in_ Syria _Repo rt.pd f?att achau th=AN oY7cq iN6Vo 8t_OS aAu-0 a6Jxw ENqZk 
j8Stz UbkNk K5Ocq 8QqCr I10Lf tMLGu khmPV 0FCke zSKV5 3m25m VsgJL 8AYOJ SW0-4 
g0I1o vIECi GJH1H Adw2j UA5w3 172Fy uBwKg QkxO4 Nqd_W AWAgw ybXO- Imnz_ 
zUNPO Gkg_h ZLJf4 SB5Ad tgKK2 0rKk- DufLh L4_wN 2Mnps oCKI0 gPJdg Vre45 nQm1X 
wO9TP k-pZS 3vBm4 t-Qpq VNK2r Xo_35 XilF5 njvTD 71ius rgchH Wwe-Z sgtfC 3OfQg 
kqw%3 D%3D&attredirects=0 [accessed 5 April 2018] p.3.
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the executive and make for uncomfortable headlines, but this seems to 
be where the matter remains in the absence of any substantive response. 
More pertinently, when the Investigatory Powers Tribunal ruled that data 
sharing arrangements between GCHQ and NSA under the latter’s PRISM 
programme were insufficient to protect human rights between 2007 and 
2014,37 doubts inevitably persist in some quarters that the ISC is either 
unwilling to censure the security services or has insufficient access to 
information within the agencies it is supposed to be overseeing.38 It is true 
that this ruling still did not establish illegality as such on the part of the 
intelligence agencies, but it could reasonably be said to mark a perhaps 
somewhat disingenuous withholding of information from those who did 
not know the right questions to ask. As mentioned, the UK is not the only 
country where there are concerns about the ability of the oversight regime 
to effectively do battle with smart intelligence services, but it is fair to say 
the ISC may still have some distance to travel when it comes to the UK’s 
particular environment of oversight.
Conclusions
Did Snowden’s revelations in the summer of 2013 initiate a process that 
resulted in changes to surveillance law in the UK? The answer is that they 
did not entirely. Concerns about the ability of the security services to con-
tinue to be able to access communications data in the changing technologi-
cal environment and contrary concerns about rights to privacy in the digital 
age in advanced national security states, were both well underway and lead-
ing to a vigorous public debate before Snowden appeared on the scene.
In other ways, however, there is no doubt that Snowden added materi-
ally to a growing sense of the need for reliable accountability and over-
sight of the intelligence services that had been gathering pace since the 
end of the Cold War. A counterfactual analysis is not available, but it 
seems doubtful that the UK would have initiated such a major inquiry into 
the right balance between privacy and security had Snowden not acted as 
he did. The feverish atmosphere in the immediate aftermath of the revela-
tions probably paved the way for the three heads of the UK intelligence 
37  Owen Bowcott (2015) ‘UK-US surveillance regime was unlawful “for seven years’’’, The 
Guardian, 6 February 2015, retrieved from www.t hegua rdian .com/ uk-ne ws/20 15/fe b/06/ 
gchq- mass- inter net-s urvei llanc e-unl awful -cour t-nsa [accessed 4 April 2018].
38  Alan Travis (21015) ‘ISC report acknowledges failings but paves way for snooper’s char-
ter’, The Guardian, 12 March 2015, retrieved from www.t hegua rdian .com/ us-ne ws/20 
15/ma r/12/ intel ligen ce-ag encie s-fin ally- under stand -need -to-s tep-o ut-of -the- shado ws 
[accessed April 2018].
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agencies to give open evidence to the ISC for the first time in a session 
streamed (not quite live) on the internet in October 2013. The ISC itself 
noted that this was, ‘a very significant step forward in terms of the open-
ness and transparency of the Agencies’.39 It may also be the case that the 
new IPA Bill would not have been subjected to such a rigorous and com-
prehensive degree of debate and scrutiny without the Snowden effect. This 
is not to comment on whether or not he should have acted as he did, but 
merely to consider the effects.
Two of the key philosophical debates here are where the limits of the 
state’s surveillance powers should be drawn and how far or otherwise we 
can trust those charged with keeping us safe to do so in a legal and pro-
portionate way. On the latter, David Omand is clear that the intelligence 
personnel, some of whom he previously directed, should be largely above 
suspicion. He suggests that, ‘it is difficult to overstate the overall impact in 
recent years of … legislation on the ethos of the UK agencies in creating a 
disciplined culture within the agencies, while enabling them to carry out a 
full range of intelligence gathering operations for authorized purposes’.40 
If we couple this with David Anderson’s contention that the passage to the 
new IPA was an exercise in how good law should be conducted in a modern 
democracy, then we should all feel reasonably reassured. Clearly, however, 
this does not convince everyone, and situations such as the ISC’s recent 
report on potential complicity by UK intelligence agencies in the torture 
of terrorist suspects in the post-9/11 era will do nothing for building public 
trust in those agencies.41
Some will be of the opinion, however, that many of those on the civil 
liberties side of the equation will consider any discussion about the legal 
model for state surveillance to be moot, since they are fundamentally 
opposed to the central principle of extensive state surveillance capabilities. 
A terse exchange during the Privacy and Security Inquiry between the civil 
rights group Big Brother Watch and Hazel Blears MP, a member of the 
ISC, was indicative in this respect. Big Brother Watch wrote to the ISC on 
13 March 2015 in fairly robust terms, complaining about what they felt 
was a misrepresentation of their evidence given to the Privacy and Security 
39  Intelligence and Security Committee (2013) ‘Open evidence session’ (23 October 2013), 
retrieved from http: //isc .inde pende nt.go v.uk/ news- archi ve/23 octob er201 3 [accessed 18 July 
2018].
40  David Omand (2012) Securing the State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.284.
41  Intelligence and Security Committee (2018) ‘Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–
2010’, report presented to Parliament, HC 1113, 28 June 2018, retrieved from https ://fa 
s.org /irp/ world /uk/i sc-de taine e.pdf [accessed 29 June 2018]. 
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Inquiry.42 They claimed that Hazel Blears had stated in a press conference 
following publication of the inquiry report that:
some of our witnesses considered that it is preferable to allow some 
terrorist attacks to happen rather than to allow any form of bulk 
interception.43
This, claimed Big Brother Watch, was a dangerous misrepresentation of a 
response given to a question during the inquiry hearings. In response to a 
demand for an immediate public correction of this point, Blears stuck to her 
guns about the way in which Big Brother Watch’s comments had been ren-
dered in the report and suggested that they should have said earlier if they 
wished to clarify any of their statements.44 She noted that:
If Big Brother Watch wishes to clarify its position in respect of whether 
bulk interception is unacceptable in a free society even if it leads to 
terrorists being prevented from carrying out attacks, then we would be 
happy to note that position.45
While critics of the government could consider this to be an emotionally 
charged mechanism for discrediting any position of opposition to bulk sur-
veillance powers, it does throw down the gauntlet as to how, exactly, success-
ful national security can and should be delivered in the modern environment 
of threat and communications behaviours. There does appear to be a paucity 
of ideas on how this could be done, other than an implicit suggestion of a 
completely surveillance-free utopia. It is also the case that current technol-
ogy does not appear to support any model whereby terrorists and criminals 
are surgically discriminated from the rest of the population ahead of time. It 
may be that advances in big data technology will allow such actions in time, 
but they do not do so at the time of writing.
42  The letter was issued by Renate Samson, Chief Executive of Big Brother Watch, and 
addressed to the Senior Assistant Clerk to the ISC, ‘in the absence of the Committee hav-
ing a Chair’. (The correspondence fell between elections at a time when the ISC’s chair and 
members had not yet been officially reappointed.) All related correspondence can be seen 
on the ISC website retrieved from http: //isc .inde pende nt.go v.uk/ news- archi ve/17 march 
2015 [accessed 8 August 2018]. 
43  Ibid.
44  Intelligence and Security Committee (2015) response letter to Renate Samson, Chief 
Executive of Big Brother Watch, from Hazel Blears MP, 17 March 2015 (Ref: ISC 
4.21/146). 
45  Ibid.
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Perhaps ironically for Snowden’s supporters, the new IPA Bill that 
resulted from the debates he substantially punctuated, does not claw back 
surveillance powers from the state but further consolidates them to a large 
extent. It is true that the authorisation process for content interception has 
been substantially strengthened, and the oversight commissioner function 
has been streamlined and simplified, but in other ways, the legal regime 
covering all surveillance activities has had further complexity added to it. 
This is not necessarily a deliberate attempt to make things as difficult as 
possible for the scrutineers, and may be as much about the incredible com-
plexity of surveillance in the modern digital age as about any nefarious 
agency. But it leaves open the question as to whether more legal streamlin-
ing will be necessary in the future.
Similarly, what has not been achieved is any greater clarity about the 
rights to privacy in the digital age and the proper boundaries to state sur-
veillance in the new environment. It is interesting to note that more recent 
debate has swung slightly away from states themselves and towards the big 
data activities of the major CSPs, who have now reached sufficient size and 
profit that they rival the GDP of many states. Indeed, the purported founder 
of the internet, Tim Berners-Lee, for example, has targeted the big social 
media companies in his concerns about global governance of the internet46, 
having previously been a vocal critic of the UK’s ‘snooper’s charter’.47 There 
is a logic in that Berners-Lee would rather see measures for promoting good 
governance on the internet than unfettered abilities to control and manipu-
late it for information gain. But while the debates continue about the proper 
boundaries of privacy and security, advanced states such as the US and UK 
have made sure they continue to have substantial capabilities in the digital 
domain, and to make sure these are enshrined in law.
46  Tim Berners-Lee (2018) ‘The web can be weaponised – and we can’t count on big tech to 
stop it’, The Guardian, 12 March 2018, retrieved from www.t hegua rdian .com/ comme ntisf 
ree/2 018/m ar/12 /tim- berne rs-le e-web -weap on-re gulat ion-o pen-l etter [accessed 4 April 
2018].
47  Alex Hern (2015) ‘Tim Berners-Lee urges Britain to fight “snooper’s charter’’’, The 
Guardian, 29 May 2015, retrieved from www.t hegua rdian .com/ techn ology /2015 /may/ 29/ti 
m-ber ners- lee-u rges- brita in-to -figh t-sno opers -char ter [accessed 5 May 2018].
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